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consciousness. It certainly does not belong to that grouping which we call the outer-world.

If we agree that this is correct, it becomes interesting to note that by adding this psychic quality "out-thereness" to some special item in consciousness to which it is not originally attached, we at once transform this item into an object-in-the-outer-world. A cry of distress out of the mist, carrying with it the psychic quality of "out-thereness," at once transforms what I had just thought to be a mere illusion,—a purely mental thing—into a real man in the outer-world.

On the other hand, we at times find in experience objects-in-the-outer-world from which we are able to remove the psychic quality of "out-thereness;" and then we find that the object-in-the-outer-world disappears as such, and forthwith the experience becomes what appears to be merely an item in consciousness. The drunkard sees real snakes; but, if he is not too far gone, we may convince him that he has experienced only a mental state which we call an hallucination. We thus by reasoning, which is a purely mental process, remove the "out-thereness" quality, which is a mental quality, and *instantly* his object-in-the-outer-world becomes an experience wholly within what he calls his consciousness.

HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL

NEW YORK CITY.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Liberty and Democracy and Other Essays in War-Time. HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER. Marshall Jones Company. 1918. Pp. 229.

This collection of essays was "written, from time to time, under the impulse of events, and for contemporary reading. They can not, therefore, pretend to either system or consecution, and they undoubtedly contain repetitions, not only as between the several essays, but of matters that have been frequently and better expressed elsewhere. . . . True, there is here no constructive, no reconstructive programme. But the hour calls for diagnosis."

I select three points which seem to me to express the burden of the book: 1. The downfall of traditional democracy; 2. An analysis of the German conception of freedom; 3. A sketch of the lines along which a re-statement of democracy should be undertaken.

The dominant intellectual characteristic of the eighteenth century was its spirit of optimism, an optimism at once romantic, humanitarian and complacent. Its basis was founded on man's trust in reason as an expression of universal law and a faith in humanity

as inherently good. Democracy was born of this optimism. To-day we see its downfall. "I can think of no death in history quite so stupendously bitter as is that which has stricken down the gorgeous humanitarian optimism of the nineteenth century." Why this collapse? Partly because the underlying ideas were never subjected to reflective criticism. Furthermore, the basis of social solidarity and the principles of political unity were entirely subjective and sentimental. Liberty was a thing of ideas, feelings, literature and art. It lacked the machinery of organization for the execution of its ideas; it had no objective basis in institutions. Men attempted to fraternize on the basis of sentiment. As a result there developed a childish romanticism and a *laissez-faire* philosophy.

Germany, on the other hand, developed a tyrannous institutionalism. "The institution of feudalism was Germany's first gift to European civilization." The structural principle of feudalism is not liberty, but loyalty. The individual occupies no status as an individual, but derives his status by virtue of his relation to one higher up. Every man is some other man's man. This leads at once to the cardinal German virtues of system, organization and efficiency, involving a régime which is mechanical, non-human and impersonal. "A machine has all of the devices of a rational purpose, but none of its soul. . . . It is an efficiency destitute of that adaptability of means and idealization of ends which is the humane essence of true reason."

If democracy, lacking an objective basis of control, has been drifting toward anarchy, autocracy, in its glorification of authority, has tended toward tyranny. What is needed is an analysis of the concept of liberty, a liberty which will be more than a sentiment and less than submissive loyalty to an established institution. "But while it is easy to see the fault in what we would avoid, it is not so easy to discover the virtue of what we prize. The essence of liberty is illusive of analysis, possibly because the thing itself is so passionately a part of the colour of life." There follows, therefore, no complete analysis of liberty, but the lines along which it should be undertaken are indicated. Freedom means man thinking; it is, therefore, a characteristic of reason and not of feeling. The exercise of reason involves both freedom and control. The two are not hostile elements set over against each other, but supplementary phases of developing experience. Having connected liberty with rational choice, involving both individual initiative and responsible submission to the material conditions of thought, "it follows inevitably that reason must be sought not in collectivistic states, but in democratical states, where liberty and individualism are prized."

M. T. McCLURE.